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1 Introduction: changes
The transformation of the security environment that 
has taken place in the last few years has presented a clear 
challenge to the EU. Already mired in economic stagnation 
and financial problems in the Eurozone, Brussels has been 
hit by the fall-out from the Arab Spring – Islamist terrorist 
attacks and the refugee crisis – whose sheer scale threatens 
to destabilise states on the EU’s periphery and undermine 
the values on which modern Europe is built. These issues 
have dominated the policy agenda. 
However, it is no exaggeration to say that the future of the 
relationship with Russia may well constitute one of the 
EU’s most difficult external challenges in the longer term. 
Indeed, official EU policy statements in the immediate 
aftermath of the Crimea annexation emphasised that ‘the 
notion of Europe whole and free, based on the shared 
commitment to human rights and freedoms, democracy, 
and the rule of law, as well as freedom and sovereignty of all 
the European states… is being challenged in an extremely 
serious and dangerous way’.1 Leading politicians in Europe 
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1 Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, ‘Russian pressure on 
Eastern Partnership countries, destabilisation of eastern Ukraine’, Plenary Session, European Parliament Strasbourg, 
16 April 2014, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-331_en.htm. A European Parliament 
resolution ‘strongly condemns Russia’s aggressive and expansionist policy, which constitutes a threat to the unity 
and independence of Ukraine and poses a potential threat to the EU itself ’; European Parliament, Resolution on the 
situation in Ukraine, 2014/2965(RSP), Strasbourg, 15 January 2015.
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followed suit.2 A noted British commentator condemned 
Russia’s authoritarian system and called on the West to 
respond to the challenge of Putin – ‘the Slobodan Milošević 
of the former Soviet Union’.3 The majority opinion among 
European policymakers and experts is neatly summed up 
by François Heisbourg: ‘revisionist Russia emerges as a 
largely unpredictable player, which no longer gives prime 
importance to abiding (even in appearance) by international 
law, with a neo-imperial vision in the form of the Eurasian 
project and an across-the-board enmity for Western 
institutions in Europe and Western values in the world’.4 
The political-military response has been led by NATO, with 
practical measures aimed at ‘deterrence and collective defence’ 
and the suspension of institutional cooperation with Russia. 
NATO’s Readiness Action Plan promises a greater military 
presence in the eastern Europe member states, an enhanced 
military preparedness through the Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force, and a more coherent and responsive political 
approach to crises.5 These measures have been accompanied 
by US and EU sanctions, intended to form a united front of 
Western countries against Russian aggression. 
Despite these measures, European opinion is divided over 
Moscow’s strategic objectives and the regional consequences 
of the Ukraine conflict. Policy reports have played down 
the prospect of a return to the Cold War6 and statements 
by EU leaders have emphasised that the door remains 
open to re-engagement with Russia if a resolution of the 
conflict can be found.7 The dangers posed by the potential 
spill-over of the conflict, and the breakdown of political-
military agreements and links between western states and 
Russia, are widely recognised and underline the need to seek 
cooperation over issues of mutual interest.8 
This paper  raises several important questions:
• How does Russia’s intervention in Ukraine affect 
Europe’s rules-based security environment?
• What are Moscow’s intentions in the EU-Russia 
neighbourhood and how could Russia’s actions impact 
on the EU itself?
• How are the EU and its member states addressing the 
challenges posed by Russia?
• Can the EU and NATO work together to provide 
incentives for Russia to accept a common approach 
aimed at institutionalising partnership and reviving 
cooperative security management, without making 
concessions to Russian aggression? Put simply, how do 
the European powers both ‘deter’ and ‘engage’ Putin’s 
Russia? 
2  Russia and EU security relations: 
strangers when we meet
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Russia’s 
willing return into the community of European nations was 
marked by the signing of the 1994 EU-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (ratified only in 1997, after 
the conclusion of the first Chechen war), which established 
both the economic and political basis for cooperation rooted 
in common values. As Brussels felt its way towards a greater 
role as a foreign and security policy actor, it published in 
1999 the EU Common Strategy on Russia, which aimed 
to promote stability, security and prosperity through a 
permament political and security dialogue with Moscow by 
the ‘integration of Russia into a common European economic 
and social space’.9 The cooperative relationship with Russia 
– ‘a major factor in our security and prosperity’ – was 
reaffirmed in the EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy.10 
A ‘common space on external security’ was launched at the 
2 Ian Traynor and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Don’t appease Putin like we did Hitler, Cameron warns’, The Guardian,  
3 September 2014; Christian Reiermann, ‘Schäuble Says Putin’s Crimea Plans Reminiscent of Hitler’, 31 March 
2014, at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/schaeuble-compares-putin-moves-in-crimea-to-policies-of-
hitler-a-961696.html 
3 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Sometimes only guns will stop guns. And Putin must be stopped’, The Guardian,  
2 February 2015.
4 ‘Preserving Post-Cold War Europe’, Survival, 57, 1, 2015, p. 34.
5 Wales Summit Declaration, meeting of NATO’s North Atlantic Council, Wales, 4-5 September 2014.
6 Group of Policy Experts, Collective Defence and Common Security – Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, 
report to the NATO Secretary-General, June 2014, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/
pdf_2014_06/20140606_140602-peg-collective_defence.pdf
7 Issues paper on relations with Russia (2015), Foreign Affairs Council of 19 January 2015, at http://blogs.ft.com/
brusselsblog/files/2015/01/Russia.pdf
8 Ian Kearns and Denitsa Raynova, Managing Dangerous Incidents: the need for a NATO-Russia Memorandum of 
Understanding, European Leadership Network, 7 March 2016, at http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/
managing-dangerous-incidents-the-need-for-a-nato-russia-memorandum-of-understanding_3578.html?mc_
cid=031ce5cbc7&mc_eid=92b06f72c7 
9 Common strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/414/cfsp), at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2003/november/tradoc_114137.pdf  
10 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003, at https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  
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May 2003 EU-Russia Summit; vague in terms of actual 
commitments, it was a means to foster shared approaches 
to security, including in their common neighbourhood. 
Moscow had also responded favourably to the development 
of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
seen as a potential counterweight to NATO, and appeared 
ready to develop common approaches to security issues 
such as the fight against terrorism, disarmament and non-
proliferation, crisis management and civil protection. More 
extensive bilateral links on trade and energy, as well as 
aspects of internal security, were aimed at assisting Russia’s 
political consolidation and economic regeneration after the 
lost decade of the 1990s and promoting its integration into 
the world economy.
2.1  The Russia-Georgia conflict and the EU’s 
‘upgraded’ eastern policy 
However, the EU-Russia partnership lacked strategic 
direction and common perceptions of a normative 
framework. The EU’s promotion in the common 
neighbourhood of democratic reform, good governance, 
the rule of law and human rights, particularly through 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), began 
increasingly to disquiet Moscow. Ukraine’s ‘Orange 
Revolution’ in 2004 – uncomfortably close to home as far 
as Moscow was concerned – prompted Russia’s governing 
elite to reconsider the EU’s eastern policy. Russia’s 
intervention in South Ossetia in August 2008, in response 
to the deaths of civilians and Russian peace-keepers caused 
by the attack by Georgian forces, led to mediation by 
President Sarkozy (acting under France’s EU presidency) 
to end the fighting. However, Moscow remained highly 
suspicious of the ambition of Georgia’s president at the 
time, Mikheil Saakashvili, to forge deeper relations with 
NATO and the EU. Saakashvili had been emboldened by 
NATO’s proclamation of an ‘open door’ policy for Ukraine 
and Georgia at its 2008 NATO Bucharest summit. The EU 
– which supported Georgia’s territorial integrity within 
its internationally-recognised borders – criticised Russia’s 
subsequent recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s 
independence and Moscow’s military support for these 
11 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk (2015), Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The Integration Challenge 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan), p. 45.
12 Eastern Partnership, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM 
[2008] 823/4, 3 December 2008.
13 Sergei Lavrov, ‘It’s not Russia that is destabilising Ukraine’, The Guardian, 8 April 2014.
14 Roy Allison, ‘Security policy, geopolitics and international order in EU-Russia relations during the crisis’, Avoiding 
a New ‘Cold War’: The Future of EU-Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis, LSE Ideas special report 
SR020, March 2016.
15 House of Lords European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine, 6th 
report of Session 2014-15 (London: The Stationery Office Limited), 20 February 2015, p. 27.
separatist regions, which effectively ‘froze’ the conflict. 
Brussels launched the civilian EU Monitoring Mission 
in Georgia, but it was excluded from South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia.
The EU’s offer in 2008 of political association and economic 
integration through an Association Agreement and Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine 
– a measure that ‘represented a critical upgrade in the EU’s 
eastern policy’11 – intensified concern in Russia: Ukraine 
was seen by Moscow as a potential partner in President 
Putin’s plans for regional integration and its association 
with the EU could potentially threaten this integration. The 
launch of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative – which, 
in the EU’s own words, was ‘responding to the need for a 
clearer signal of EU commitment following the conflict in 
Georgia and its broader repercussions’12 – further deepened 
Moscow’s suspicions. 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area did not in 
fact constrain Ukraine from pursuing cooperation within 
other free trade agreements favoured by Russia. However, 
Moscow – extrapolating its own security logic onto the EU’s 
policy – accused Brussels of forcing Kiev to ‘choose between 
East and West’13, in effect accusing the EU of trying to 
establish its own sphere of influence in the common 
neighbourhood. Efforts to revive the failing security 
relationship produced no breakthrough, with Brussels 
not prepared to offer Russia the kind of institutionalised 
security partnership that would allow Moscow to influence 
EU security and defence policy.14 Moscow’s proposals 
for a European Security Treaty were largely ignored by 
the European states. The subsequent German-Russian 
Meseberg initiative for joint EU-Russia conflict resolution 
also met with failure, since there was no agreement among 
EU member states on how to revise existing arrangements. 
Meetings of the Permanent Partnership Council, the main 
body for Russia-EU cooperation at the ministerial level, 
were also discontinued, in Russia’s view due to Brussels’ 
reluctance to engage in systematic discussion of EU-Russia 
political relations.15 
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2.2 The Euromaidan
The growing strain on EU-Russia relations – and 
Moscow’s increasing resentment over its marginalisation 
in the European security order – came to a head with the 
decision by Ukraine’s President Yanukovich not to sign 
the Association Agreement with the EU in November 
2013 in favour of accepting an economic package from 
Moscow. This decision sparked the Euromaidan – a popular 
uprising against the ruling elite’s corruption and political 
ineptitude. Brussels’ initial response to the Euromaidan was 
relatively restrained; it hoped that an agreement between 
the Yanukovich regime and the opposition, concluded on 
20-21 February 2014, would produce a settlement to create 
a government of national unity. 
However, once the Euromaidan protesters refused to 
accept the agreement and Yanukovich fled from Kiev, the 
EU voiced support for the protest and made it clear that 
Yanukovich’s departure from the presidency had to precede 
any resumption of talks on the Association Agreement. 
The EU Foreign Affairs Council monitored the situation 
and declared it was ready to take measures if the crisis 
escalated, fearing an escalation of conflict.16 The EU’s 
promise of political support to the interim government was 
accompanied by the signing of the political provisions of the 
Association Agreement and pledges of financial assistance, 
as well as mediation by the EU of energy disputes between 
Russia and Ukraine. 
2.3 Sanctions
The most important instrument used by the EU to respond 
to Russia’s annexation of Crimea is the sanctions regime, put 
in place in July 2014 and since strengthened and prolonged 
to July 2016, which includes restrictions on sectoral 
cooperation and access to EU capital markets and defence-
related goods and technologies. In itself the sanction regime 
is significant: in discouraging any further moves by Moscow 
to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty by constraining Russia’s 
trading links, it represents a shift away from the post-Cold 
War aim of integrating Russia into the global economic 
order. 
Moscow has responded by placing sanctions on imports 
of goods from EU countries. This trend towards the 
politicisation of trade relations, which appears to signal a 
conscious choice by both sides to limit interdependence, 
is another nail in the coffin of the much-talked about 
strategic partnership. Indeed, this trend even extends to 
the securitisation of energy relations, with calls for the EU 
to sharply reduce dependence on Russian gas imports to 
minimise the possibility of Moscow’s employing energy as 
a ‘weapon’ against vulnerable east-central European states. 
To what extent this will be possible, or even desirable, is a 
matter of some contention, with some experts pointing to 
the uncertainty of the EU’s longer-term energy strategy and 
suggesting that there is no conclusive evidence that Russia 
will use energy as a ‘geopolitical’ tool against Europe.17 
In any case, the partial isolation of Russia resulting from 
sanctions, alongside the EU’s offer of deeper engagement 
with Ukraine, has significant implications for future 
political relations – and may deepen tensions – between the 
three protagonists.  
2.4  Common Security and Defence Policy and 
the EU’s role in crisis management
The European Council also established a Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission in July 2014, the EU 
Advisory Mission (EUAM) for Civilian Security Sector 
Reform Ukraine. The EUAM’s remit is limited to building 
the capacity of the post-Euromaidan reforming state to 
bolster the rule of law and withstand external attempts to 
undermine its security. Modest though this political support 
appears in terms of crisis management, it both provides 
visibility for the EU in Ukraine and supports Kiev’s foreign 
policy reorientation towards a deeper partnership with EU, 
as well as with NATO – however unlikely the longer-term 
goal of membership in these organisations due to opposition 
from leading member states. 
The EU has also been the largest contributor to the OSCE’s 
Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, which monitors 
the movement of forces and exchange of prisoners, 
facilitates dialogue, aids civil society in conflict resolution 
and reports on the humanitarian, social and economic 
situation to help guide political negotiations.18 This allows 
for a more rational use of the two organisations’ resources 
and a better division of labour in terms of crisis monitoring 
between them.19 
16 Ana E. Juncos and Richard G. Whitman, ‘Europe as a Regional Actor: Neighbourhood Lost?’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 53 annual review, 2015, p. 203.
17 Katja Yafimava, European Energy Security and the Role of Russian Gas: Assessing the Feasibility and the Rationale of 
Reducing Dependence, Istituto Affari Internazionali working paper 15/54, December 2015.
18 OSCE Thematic Report, Civil society and the crisis in Ukraine, SEC/FR/125/15Corr.1*, 4 March 2015.
19 Teija Tiilikainen ed. (2015), Reviving Co-operative Security in Europe through the OSCE, OSCE Network, 2015,  
p. 17.
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2.5  Russian views on the Ukraine conflict: 
estrangement…
Russia’s account of the Ukraine crisis, promoted through 
a sustained information campaign, differs sharply from 
Europe’s. In Moscow’s view, Brussels backtracked on the 
agreement of 20-21 February 2014; Yanukovich’s removal 
amounted to an unconstitutional coup, supported by 
Western governments obsessed with democracy promotion. 
The intervention by Russian military personnel was 
aimed at protecting the Russophone population from 
the new authorities in Kiev – described by Moscow as 
‘ultranationalist’ – which refuse to engage in direct dialogue 
with the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
Moscow insists that constitutional reform, negotiated 
by Kiev with the Donbass regions to include an amnesty 
for separatists and a special status for the Donbass, must 
precede reinstatement of full control of the state border by 
the Ukraine government and the withdrawal of all foreign 
armed forces, as provided for in the Minsk-2 Agreements, 
which provide a framework to resolve the conflict.20 
This is roundly criticised by European governments as 
Russia’s attempt to legitimise its efforts to limit Ukraine’s 
sovereignty.
Russia thus attempts to portray itself as the peace-broker 
despite being penalised by Western sanctions and a freeze 
in relations, which will remain in force until it fulfils its 
part of the Minsk-2 Agreements by withdrawing its 
troops from Ukraine. Moreover, Moscow criticises what it 
perceives as Kiev’s determined attempt to damage historical 
cultural and linguistic ties between Ukraine and Russia. 
Though a UN General Assembly majority vote deemed the 
March 2014 referendum in Crimea and Sevastopol invalid 
and recognised Ukraine’s territorial integrity21, Crimea’s 
secession was compared by Moscow to Kosovo’s secession 
from Serbia and defended as being in line with international 
legal norms on self-determination. 
Moscow has tried to divert attention away from its military 
support for anti-government groups in the Donbass and the 
annexation of Crimea by criticising what it calls Europe’s 
own intervention in Ukraine. But it has gone further, 
vilifying Europe for supposedly encouraging regime change 
in Russia itself22 – an existential fear of the Putin regime. Its 
response to the Ukraine crisis – portrayed as an issue vital 
for the survival of the Russian nation and state – is depicted 
as resisting a hegemonic European project and a defence 
of the ‘Russian world’. This has raised the suspicion that 
Moscow is ready to re-establish its own sphere of influence 
in its wider neighbourhood, with domestic support 
underpinned by the promotion of nationalist-conservative 
Russian values.23 
Many prominent political commentators and experts are in 
agreement with official views. One expert argues that the 
EU has damaged its reputation as a responsible actor and 
aligned its foreign policy with US interests by promoting 
regime change in Kiev ‘through violent and unconstitutional 
means’.24 The fall-out from the Ukraine crisis represents the 
‘new normality’ in which ‘the current level of confrontation 
is not an aberration but a new norm’ in Europe’s security 
environment.25 According to the experienced commentator 
Sergei Karaganov, Russia ‘speaks for the entire Non-West’ 
in demanding change in decision-making on the rules of 
security.26 Put simply, their argument is that Russia now 
rejects the Western conception of an inclusive regional 
community of states, based on shared norms and values, 
in post-Cold War Europe. The ‘new normality’ referred to 
above is thus synonymous with a new uncertainty that now 
pervades EU-Russia relations, not least in their common 
neighbourhood.
2.6 ... but not isolation
The opinions described above represent the majority view 
in Russia’s political establishment. However, some Russian 
20 The Minsk-2 agreements were signed by Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany on 12 February 2015 - see text at 
http://www.unian.info/politics/1043394-minsk-agreement-full-text-in-english.html – and were endorsed by the 
UN Security Council; Security Council resolution S/Res/2202, 17 February 2015.
21 United Nations General Assembly (2014), A/RES/68/262, 1 April.
22 See Sergei Lavrov, interview with France 24 TV station, 16 December 2014, at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/
newsline/29C0BA2F20252442C3257DB000502785 
23 House of Lords European Union Committee, The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine, p. 39. See 
also Roy Allison, ‘Russian “deniable” intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules’, International 
Affairs, 90, 6, 2014.
24 See Alexey Gromyko, ‘Smaller or Greater Europe?’, Revisti di Studi Politici Internazionali, 81, 4, 2014, at http://
www.ieras.ru/gromyko/Smaller%20or%20Greater%20Europe.pdf 
25 Alexey Gromyko, ‘A new normal or a new “big agreement”’, Sovremennaya Evropa, 2, 2015, at http://
instituteofeurope.ru/images/stories/structura/gromyko/gromyko2.2015.pdf. This was echoed in the title of a 
recent policy paper by a leading European think-tank: Susi Dennison and Nick Witney, ‘Europe’s neighbourhood: 
crisis as the new normal’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 23 June 2015.
26 Sergei Karaganov, ‘Europe and Russia: preventing a new Cold War’, Russia in Global Affairs, 7 June.
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experts express an altogether different conception of Russian 
national interests. They argue that rejecting the ‘European 
choice’ of political, economic and social modernisation 
undermines what should be the main objective of foreign 
policy – creating a favourable external environment for 
domestic development.27 These moderate elites criticise 
Moscow’s reliance on the concept of ‘limited sovereignty’, 
which emphasises national interests and historical justice 
rather than accepted legal and normative rules; any gains 
for Russia in Ukraine, they argue, are outweighed by 
the withdrawal of the latter from Russian-led regional 
integration initiatives. They also point to the ignorance in 
Russia’s political establishment of social processes that are 
shaping a revival of a national civic identity in Ukraine.28
There are signs that this trend of opinion still has influence 
at the decision-making level in Moscow. Foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov has underscored Russia’s attempts to resolve 
the conflict through the Normandy quartet of Russia, 
Ukraine, France and Germany and avoid isolation.29 
Despite his often fierce rhetoric in defence of Russia’s 
independent foreign policy, Putin himself has periodically 
revived the narrative of positive relations with Europe.30 
Although the shift towards a more conservative-nationalist 
paradigm at odds with Europe has undoubtedly gained 
ascendancy over recent years, it is far from monolithic 
within Russia’s political establishment. This deep-seated 
ambivalence – between the progressive vision of a common 
European-Russian economic and social space on the one 
hand, and the conservative-nationalist idea of a sovereign 
Russia competing with a weakened Europe for influence 
in the international order on the other – has marked post-
Cold War political thinking in Russia. 
3  The EU’s response to Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine: life on Mars?
3.1 NATO’s strategic posture
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, the political-
military response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine has been led 
by the NATO alliance. NATO’s Readiness Action Plan will 
effect ‘a far-reaching adaptation of NATO military strategic 
posture’ with a ‘renewed emphasis on deterrence and 
collective defence capabilities’.31 A White Paper, prepared 
in the run-up to the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, 
has advocated ‘a far-reaching transformation of the Alliance’ 
to update its readiness ‘by an order of magnitude, not just 
incrementally’; it explicitly refers to a Russia ‘unconstrained 
by international law’ posing a long-term threat to Allies and 
EU member states.32 It is clear that NATO member states 
are seeking a clear, common strategic framework for defence 
planning to deal with the perceived challenge emanating 
from Russia.
Critics have pointed to the likely problems that NATO will 
face. The NATO spearhead Joint Task Force, to be stationed 
on a ‘rotational’ basis in eastern Europe and designed for 
rapid deployment to conflict points, may face logistical 
problems and may not be suited for the potential challenges 
presented by Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’.33 The Defence 
Investment Pledge launched at the 2015 NATO Wales 
summit – whereby member states aim to spend a minimum 
of 2 per cent of GDP on defence34 – may not be realised 
by most European member states, and the shortfall risks 
widening the transatlantic divide over security in Europe 
at a time when the US wants Europe to take on more of 
the burden of security provision in its neighbourhood. Nor 
27 Alexei Arbatov, ‘Collapse of the World Order?’, Russia in Global Affairs, 23 September 2014.
28 Institute of Europe, ‘The Ukraine crisis: expert assessment’, Sovremennaya Evropa, 3, pp 14-16, at http://www.
sov-europe.ru/2014/3/Ukk.pdf 
29 Lavrov has said that Russia will not ‘shut itself away in its own “little world”’; speech at the RF Federation 
Council, 20 May 2015, at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/7D5C10AE87AA6F9843257E4B003A396A
30 Vladimir Putin, press conference, Russia-EU summit, 28 January 2014, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/20113
31 Statement by NATO Defence Ministers, Press release (2015) 094, 25 June 2015, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/news_121133.htm
32 NATO Transformation Seminar 2015 (2015), Next Steps in NATO’s Transformation: To the Warsaw Summit 
and Beyond, NATO/Atlantic Council White Paper, Washington, DC, March 2015. This paper recommends 
a ‘strategic realignment’ and adaptation of the Alliance’s core tasks to include a central role for deterrence, the 
pursuit of ‘options for collective defence measures under the threshold of Article 5’ in response to ‘hybrid warfare’, 
and ‘a more coherent strategy of engagement towards strategic neighbours in the East’.
33 Martin Zapfe, Efficacy, not Efficiency: Adjusting NATO’s Military Integration, Research paper no. 118, NATO 
Defense College Rome, August 2015, pp. 9-10. There are debates over the exact meaning of ‘hybrid warfare’, but 
the term is generally used to denote a combination of conventional and unconventional, overt and covert, regular 
and irregular use of forces, together with the use of information and cyber warfare.
34 Wales Summit Declaration, p. 4. The US has consistently called for European Allies – most of which spend less 
than 2 per cent – to reverse the decline of defence capabilities in Europe; see Ian Traynor, ‘US defence chief blasts 
Europe over NATO’, The Guardian, 10 June 2011. 
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is it clear how this ‘reassurance’ to member states will help 
Ukraine, which is not a member state and does not warrant 
the article 5 defence guarantee; NATO is only offering 
Kiev  ‘strategic consultations’ to strengthen programmes 
on security sector reform, capacity-building and crisis 
management cooperation, rather than robust military 
support.35
3.2  The EU: a deficit of internal coordination 
on security
It is highly uncertain how NATO’s changing strategic 
approach – prioritising deterrence based on the core 
assumption that Europe now faces a long-term adversarial 
relationship with Russia – will achieve consistency with 
the EU’s need for a beneficial relationship with its largest 
and most powerful eastern neighbour. Beyond a measure 
of consensus over providing ‘reassurance’ to eastern 
member states – Poland and the Baltic states in particular 
feel threatened by Russia’s actions in Ukraine – there are 
disagreements within the EU over long-term policy. The 
UK tends towards a harder line towards Moscow. France 
and Italy – who have had a better security relationship 
with Russia in recent years – take a more pragmatic line, 
with an eye to cooperation on security challenges in the 
Middle East.36 Germany, despite having taken the lead in 
the sanctions regime, is unwilling to abandon its traditional 
Ostpolitik towards Russia.
Calls for EU member states to lead on managing security 
crises in their neighbourhood are also problematic. 
The Common Security and Defence Policy is an 
intergovernmental policy, covering the EU’s operations in 
third countries and coordinating member states’ defence 
capabilities.37 It is designed to ‘protect [the EU’s] interests 
and project its values by contributing to international 
security, helping to prevent and resolve crises and including 
through projecting power’.38 However, it was hardly 
mentioned as an appropriate policy instrument in the 
Ukraine crisis and there has been no discernible effort to 
coordinate it with the European Neighbourhood Policy. The 
only CSDP instrument is the civilian EU Advisory Mission, 
tasked with supporting revised security policies and the 
rapid implementation of reforms in Ukraine – hardly a 
projection of power. Many experts agree that the EU’s lack 
of leadership, due to overlapping competences among its 
institutions, weakens coordination among heads of state 
and governments over power projection and precludes 
effective strategic vision. Indeed, it is France and Germany, 
rather than the EU, that lead European involvement in the 
Normandy format in support of the Minsk Agreements. 
‘Hard’ security and defence in Europe remain, and will 
remain, the preserve of the NATO alliance.
3.3 Sanctions: much ado about nothing?
The fact that Brussels is locked into sanctions and trade 
restrictions is having the unintended effect of narrowing the 
basis for its economic relations with – and hence influence 
over – Russia. Evidence to date suggests that sanctions may 
in fact be provoking a more autarkic political economy in 
Russia, with resources being directed to those elites whose 
interests are closely linked with the state-directed political 
economy.39 The impact of sanctions (at the time of writing, 
at least) has had no impact on Putin’s domestic support 
ratings and shows little sign of changing current policies. 
In the longer term, diminishing economic interdependence 
between Russia and the EU – still Russia’s largest trading 
partner – bodes ill for political relations and institutional 
interaction. 
Relations have not been completely frozen. Consultations 
were held between the EU and Russia on the Association 
Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement, and talks over energy and other key trade issues 
have continued. A paper circulated by the EU Foreign 
35 David S. Yost, ‘The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine’, International Affairs, 91, 3, 
2015.
36 Claudia Major, NATO and European Security: Back to the Roots?, Istituto Affari Internazionali working paper 
15/53, December 2015, p. 11. 
37 Carmen-Cristina Cirlig, European Defence Cooperation: state of play and thoughts on an EU army, European 
Parliament briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2015. This source describes the typically 
divergent reactions by EU member states to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s support for 
the idea of a common European army, to sustain a common foreign and security policy and ‘take up Europe’s 
leadership in the world’.
38 See Jolyon Howorth, ‘European Security post-Libya and post-Ukraine: In Search of Core Leadership’, in Nathalie 
Tocci (ed.), Imagining Europe: Towards a More United and Effective EU (Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali), 
2015, pp. 134-40. Coordination between the CSDP and the ENP was called for by some EU member states 
and experts in the recent Joint Staff Working Document Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, which 
accompanied the Review of the ENP; see SWD(2015)500 final, Brussels, 18 December 2015, p. 14.
39 Richard Connolly, Troubled Times: Stagnation, Sanctions and the Prospects for Economic Reform in Russia, Chatham 
House research paper, February 2015.
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Affairs Council in January 2015 suggested that links 
between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, the 
Russia-led regional trading bloc, may form part of ‘selective 
and gradual re-engagement’ with Russia.40 However, it is far 
from clear how they would would negotiate a regulatory 
basis for such an agreement, especially when the EU and 
Russia have failed to agree on a successor agreement to the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the legal basis 
of the EU-Russia relationship. The promise of creating 
prosperity as the basis for security – the notion that 
underpinned EU policy towards Russia in the early years of 
the relationship – now appears to be a hollow one. 
But the reality remains that Russia is a strategic priority 
for many EU member states.41 Federica Mogherini, the 
EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (HR CFSP), has spoken of restoring ‘shared 
influence’ by bringing Russia back to be a ‘responsible 
player’ in international affairs.42 This is unacceptable to some 
European elites as a realistic framework for dealing with 
Russia’s challenge to the European security order, however: 
the political compromises that Brussels may be faced with 
in re-engaging with Moscow – particularly if it allows 
Russia to influence bilateral EU-Ukraine dialogue – would 
risk ‘a strategic abdication made by the European Union 
in the East’.43 If Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence is 
a crucial indicator for the future of the European order, a 
policy is needed that goes beyond simply providing Kiev 
with a credible alternative to economic dependence on 
Russia through the Association Agreement. 
3.4 A strategic approach?
The EU appears uncertain what that response might be. One 
commentator suggests that, after Crimea and the shooting 
down of the Malaysian airliner – a breach of international 
law and an atrocity near the EU’s very borders – ‘the 
credibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor is at stake’.44 
The Common Security and Defence Policy, predicated on 
autonomy from NATO so that Europeans would become 
a security provider, has had modest impact; it has led 
neither to a European strategic doctrine, based in shared 
understandings of aims, nor to an autonomous military 
capacity that might be useable in a major confrontation. It 
remains only one part of a broader EU approach to external 
policy. Rethinking institutional arrangements between 
the EU and NATO in order to establish a ‘single regional 
capacity’ for stabilising the European neighbourhood, with 
greater defence cooperation (as advocated in the NATO 
White Paper45), would mean the EU committing resources 
and developing the leadership appropriate for a military 
power – a major shift in its strategic culture, and not one 
that several of the member states are keen to see.46 
The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, 
recently reasserted before the UN General Assembly the 
European world view as enshrined in Lisbon treaty; based 
on a contemporary reading of international law, it prioritises 
the value of human security and traditional principles of the 
inviolability of borders and non-interference in sovereign 
domestic affairs.47 While this restatement of EU norms 
and values is significant, the EU faces the difficult task of 
defining its key strategic interests, setting clear objectives 
that can employ Brussels’ extensive range of instruments 
and working within other multilateral mechanisms.48 The 
June 2015 European Council meeting tasked Federica 
Mogherini, HR CFSP, with continuing ‘the process of 
strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global 
strategy on foreign and security policy… to be submitted 
40 Issues paper on relations with Russia. 
41 Author’s interview in the Council of the European Union, January 2015.
42 Federica Mogherini, Remarks following G7 foreign ministers’ meeting, Lübeck, 15 April 2015, at http://eeas.
europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150415_02_en.htm 
43 Adam Eberhardt, Dialogue with the Eurasian Union on Ukraine – an opportunity or a trap?, Centre for Eastern 
Studies commentary no. 154, 1 December 2014, pp. 3-4.
44 Steven Blockmans, Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making, Centre for 
European Policy Studies policy brief no. 320, 25 July 2014. Who shot down flight MH-17 on 17 July 2014 is still 
unclear but a Dutch investigation concluded that Russian-built missiles were used in the incident.
45 NATO Transformation Seminar, 2015.
46 See Thierry Tardy, CSDP in action – What contribution to international security?, EU Institute for Security Studies 
Chaillot Paper, no. 134, 12 June 2015.
47 Address by President Donald Tusk at the 70th UN General Assembly debate, 29 September 2015, in European 
Neighbourhood Watch, no. 119, October 2015, pp. 1-2. In the words of one leading commentator, the EU has 
a ‘moral duty’ to reflect in its foreign policy the same values as in its domestic political and social models; Sven 
Biscop, Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy, Istituto Affari Internazionali 
working paper 15/27, July 2015, p. 4.
48 Nathalie Tocci, The Neighbourhood Policy is Dead. What’s Next for European Foreign Policy Along its Arc of 
Instability?, Istituto Affari Internazionali working paper 14/16, November 2014.
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to the European Council by June 2016’.49 With the conflict 
in the Donbass ongoing and little sign that the Minsk-2 
agreements are leading to a resolution, it remains to be seen 
how the new strategy will reflect the needs of EU security 
on its eastern borders. 
3.5  The EU’s eastern policy: the uncertainty 
principle
The EU’s more immediate problems are also overshadowed 
by uncertainty. The EU’s commitment to Ukraine has been 
stepped up; a headline support package of €11 billion has 
been assembled to support political and economic reform 
there.50 It was also encouraging that Brussels resisted Russian 
pressure and refused to revise the EU-Ukraine Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement – operational from 
1 January 2016 – which incorporates important instruments 
to assist with reform. The EU Advisory Mission also 
provides important capacity-building for Ukraine’s state 
security. But to what extent will Brussels sustain its political 
and economic support to Ukraine in the longer run? 
Though the EU sanctions regime has largely held so far, the 
pressure on governments may generate a sense of Ukraine 
fatigue and force the resumption of pragmatic cooperation 
with Moscow. This is particularly the case for Germany; 
as Russia’s largest trading partner, it does not want to 
compromise its substantial exports and continuing interest 
in gas cooperation through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, 
which is also vital for Russia’s energy export strategy and its 
economy as a whole.51 It remains the case that the prospects 
for an implementable framework for a political settlement 
in Ukraine – designed to balance its integration into Europe 
with a mutually acceptable partnership with Russia – are 
hostage to domestic politics in Moscow. There is a risk 
of allowing Moscow to exercise influence over Ukrainian 
politics while shifting the burden of rebuilding eastern 
Ukraine onto Kiev.
With Moscow showing no signs of giving ground, not only 
in Ukraine but also in Moldova’s and Georgia’s internal 
conflicts, there are calls for the European Neighbourhood 
Policy to be recalibrated to promote more effectively the 
EU’s progressive, values-oriented foreign policy in the 
region. This includes more efficient delivery of Association 
Agreement benefits in return for reforms, targeting the most 
serious impediments to these reforms and better interaction 
with progressive constituencies in the partner states.52 For 
the present, however, the EU – which faces even greater 
challenges from the South in the shape of the rise of Islamic 
State and the refugee crisis – is proceeding with pragmatic 
and incremental steps. With some European elites insisting 
on the need to take account of Russian views over trade 
and security in the common neighbourhood, which may 
entail engaging with Moscow over its plans for the Eurasian 
Economic Union, authoritative experts argue that ‘the 
[Eastern] partnership looks set to resemble a framework of 
negotiated order, within which Russia has a de facto if not 
a formal voice. The dynamics of assertively extending EU 
rules and norms are in retreat’.53 
3.6 Life on Mars
In fact a ‘negotiated order’ reflects closely Moscow’s own 
perception of the regional situation: Russia, excluded from 
European-led security arrangements, aims to reassert itself 
as the hub of an alternative legal-normative order within 
which it pursues its regional interests. With Crimea now 
part of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia proclaiming 
independence despite their non-recognition by most of 
the international community, and Transnistria still holding 
out for extensive autonomy within Moldova – and with 
the conflict in the Donbass ongoing – the prospect of a 
genuine ‘common space’ of security is ever more elusive. 
Illiberal politics, corruption and non-transparent economic 
practices in these regions, together with Russia’s active 
contestation of the EU’s role in promoting rule-of-law 
reform, place considerable restrictions on the EU’s room 
for manouevre. To adapt Robert Kagan’s famous comment 
that ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus’ – inferring that the EU model of diplomacy and 
compromise clashes with the reality of power politics in the 
rest of the world – the lesson of the Ukraine conflict is: 
welcome to life on Mars.
49 European Council Meeting conclusions, EUCO 22/15, 25-26 June 2015.
50 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/ for more details.
51 See Tuomas Forsberg, ‘From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German foreign policy towards Russia’, 
International Affairs, 92, 1, 2016; Stefan Meister, ‘Russia’s return’, Berlin Policy Journal, 14 December 2015, at 
http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/russias-return/.
52 Richard Youngs and Kateryna Pishchikova, Smart geostrategy for the Eastern Partnership, Carnegie Europe, 
November 2013.
53 Thomas de Waal and Richard Youngs, Reform as Resilience: An Agenda for the Eastern Partnership, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 14 May 2015.
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4  Strategic implications for the EU: under 
pressure
4.1 ‘Soft power’ versus political vision
The Ukraine crisis has highlighted broader problems 
for the EU in adapting to the rapidly changing external 
and internal conditions that are shaping its security 
environment. Michael Smith, a leading scholar of the EU, 
has argued that Brussels is struggling to manage the ‘new 
geopolitics…  in which the rising powers have taken a 
major role’; the EU’s bilateral approach to institutionalising 
links with the emerging powers has been inconsistent and 
has shied away from major security concerns, lowering 
expectations of EU as a potential ‘strategic’ partner’.54 For 
all its ‘soft’ or ‘normative’ power – its reliance on the legal 
constraints of treaties and on convergence with European 
legislation to integrate the wider Europe – the EU has not 
been able to craft a comprehensive political vision that can 
deal strategically with Russia and leverage its normative and 
regulatory power in the region to cement its own vision of 
regional order.55 In fact it has stumbled into confrontation 
with Moscow. As mentioned in the introduction above, 
political and diplomatic attention has been diverted to 
numerous more pressing items on the policy agenda, not 
least problems with the EU’s economic model, unwelcome 
political developments in some member states and the fall-
out from the Arab Spring. Indeed, the recent review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy states that, while security 
should have a greater place in the mandate, it will ‘take 
stabilisation as its main political priority’.56 This suggests 
strongly that transforming the post-Cold War European 
order has given way to the primary task of containing the 
immediate challenges to collective security. 
Russia has also reinvigorated its interests in central Europe 
and the western Balkans and is pursuing political and 
economic ties with several states there, notably with Serbia, 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The sanctions 
regime is holding for now but Federica Mogherini’s (HR 
CFSP), suggestion, cited above, of keeping open the 
possibility of reengaging with Russia – even though Moscow 
challenges common political, economic and security 
norms – may entail the partial defection of European 
countries where common interests with Russia are seen to 
predominate, particularly if Ukraine’s current government 
fails to rein in the country’s oligarchs and reform its political 
system.
4.2 The challenges to Russia
A final question arises: how resilient is Russia in terms of 
sustaining the costs imposed on its political economy as 
a result of its actions in Ukraine? We argue that Moscow 
faces considerable challenges. The EU remains its largest 
trading partner by far and it will be difficult to absorb 
economic losses caused by sanctions over a long period, 
particularly at a time of low oil and commodity prices, 
and with post-Soviet era structural reform of the economy 
incomplete. Russian companies may well find additional 
markets in the Eurasian Economic Union and among the 
other BRICS states. However, the Eurasian Economic 
Union countries’ share of Russia’s trade is dwarfed by 
Russia’s trade with the EU; also, the BRICS states depend 
heavily on technology and trade links with the West and 
are facing their own economic problems – in fact, their 
importance for Moscow is political rather than economic. 
Nor can these states replace the technology and financial 
services available from EU countries. Even with a rise in 
oil and gas prices in prospect, Moscow’s current policies 
– relying more heavily on the mobilisation of its own 
resources, implementing an import-substitution agenda 
and narrowing relations with the EU to a simple exchange 
of commodities – risk distorting its political economy and 
undermining modernisation.57
The reliance of the Putin regime on a narrow circle of 
decision-makers and the use of economic levers for political 
ends means that Moscow struggles to think out and 
implement a progressive strategy in a rapidly evolving world. 
Russia is a weak state lacking a vision to sustain its influence 
and the ability to manage political and social change. 
Recourse to conservative-nationalist support for domestic 
legitimation of Putin’s policies may well become more 
difficult to justify if there is no resolution of the conflict 
in the Donbass and Russia is forced to swallow further 
sanctions. Indeed, Moscow is now playing down nationalist 
rhetoric and advocates a settlement in the Donbass. The 
political deadlock may endure for some time, however, and 
inflict longer-term damage to EU-Russia relations.
54 Michael Smith, ‘Beyond the comfort zone: internal crisis and external challenge in the European Union’s response 
to rising powers’, International Affairs, 89, 3, 2013.
55 Pierre Vimont, The Path to an Upgraded Foreign Policy, Carnegie Europe policy outlook, 30 June 2015.
56 Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, European Commission/HR CFSP, JOIN(2015)50final, Brussels,  
18 November 2015. 
57 See Nigel Gould-Davies, Russia’s sovereign globalization: rise, fall and future, Chatham House Russia and Eurasia 
Research Programme research paper, January 2016.
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58 Ana Juncos and Richard Whitman, ‘Europe as a Regional Actor: Neighbourhood Lost?’, p. 212.
59 Gustav Gressel, Russia’s quiet military revolution, and what it means for Europe, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, ECFR/143, October 2015, p. 13.
60 Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s permanent representative to the EU, interview with Interfaks, 17 June 2015, at http://
www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1457377 
61 This is reflected in Lavrov’s call for ‘open, unformalised dialogue on ways to form a single economic and 
humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok relying on the principles of equal and indivisible security’; speech 
at press-conference with Belarusian foreign minister, 8 June 2015, at  http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/
BE236170AB02698643257E5E003AEF3E (emphasis added).
5  Conclusions and policy recommendations: 
ashes to ashes – or a Phoenix arising?
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine undoubtedly represents a 
challenge to the rules-based security environment which, after 
the horrors of the Balkan wars of the 1990s, had largely held 
firm in Europe. Russia’s challenge to the EU’s promotion of 
liberal norms of governance in the common neighbourhood 
indicates that the EU has lost both influence and credibility 
for Russia. Authoritative commentators agree that ‘the EU’s 
milieu-shaping goals and instruments are not equipped for 
these challenges’.58 The surge in Russia’s defence spending 
(including on the strategic nuclear forces), an upturn in the 
scale of its military exercises near its western borders and 
greater interest in ‘hybrid’ warfare appear to give additional 
grounds for pessimism. At best, the evidence appears to point 
to a ‘negotiated order’ in which Moscow tries to pursue its 
sovereign interests through transactional relations. At worst, 
Europe faces a ‘systemic and ideological conflict between the 
democratic West and a revanchist Russia’.59
However, we argue that future developments are subject to 
considerable uncertainty: over how and how far Moscow 
intends to project power in the common neighbourhood, 
how its political economy will fare given the pressures it 
faces and how domestic political developments in Russia 
will shape its approach to Europe. The history of Russia’s 
relations with Europe over the last 25 years, albeit often 
volatile, by no means shows an intractable hostility. Russian 
foreign policy has been marked by a complex and fluid 
interplay between an attachment to sovereignty on the one 
hand and a recognition that interdependence demands 
shared approaches to regional and global security problems 
on the other. Domestic politics, although currently prey to 
statist (and to an extent nationalist-conservative) interests 
– and often reflected in extravagant rhetoric – is also 
influenced by moderate elites who are critical of the regime’s 
tendency to distance Russia in political and civilisational 
terms from Europe: they believe that the country’s interests 
lie in a constructive, though pragmatic, relationship with 
the EU.60 The regime’s desire to avoid isolation, reflected 
in calls for what amounts to shared management of the 
European security order, suggest a reluctance to return to 
a Soviet era- like ‘peaceful co-existence’ of two rival orders. 
It is clear – and has been for some time – that the EU 
faces clear limits to what it can achieve in the common 
neighbourhood. There are few signs that Europe’s leaders 
are prepared to invest the EU with the political will and 
capacity to allow it to emerge as a security provider in the 
eastern neighbourhood. Important though the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement is to Kiev, Brussels’ commitment to 
the neighbourhood is likely to be confined to partnership 
and capacity-building, together with a measure of economic 
integration, for the foreseeable future. Even association for 
Ukraine and other Eastern Partnership countries prompts 
divided opinions among EU member states.
Still, the member states must resist demands for trade-offs 
with Russia over other security issues – for example, the 
Syria conflict – allowing Moscow to enforce its sphere of 
interests in the neighbourhood. Entering into a bargaining 
process in which the West concedes to Russia over Ukraine 
– perhaps entailing pressure on Kiev to accept extensive self-
government in the Donbass in return for Moscow’s verbal 
acceptance of Ukraine’s control over its borders, Ukraine’s 
agreement not to seek NATO membership and some kind 
of settlement on Crimea – would embolden Russia in its 
relations with other partners. At the same time, Brussels 
faces a tricky balance between expanding its influence in 
its neighbourhood while rebuilding a stable, if not fully 
strategic, relationship with Russia. That the supposed 
‘Russian threat’ is not at the top of the priority list for most 
European governments – apart from Poland and the Baltic 
states – reflects the fact that the security environment is 
much more complex and contains challenges that differ 
from those of the Cold War.
At this stage, it is far from clear whether and how Russia’s 
continuing military involvement in the Donbass and 
annexation of Crimea, as well as its use of political and 
economic levers against Ukraine – and other regional states 
– can be accepted if the notion of a rules-based Europe is to 
have any meaning. Russia itself puts forward no developed 
ideas to transform its relationship with Europe apart from 
sketchy proposals for a legally-binding security treaty 
and the vague notion of integration between the EU and 
Eurasian Economic Union.61 Alongside the NATO-EU 
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bloc a weakly-institutionalised Russia/Eurasia hub appears 
to be emerging, with issue-specific and transactional trade 
relations between Russia and Europe. Limited measures 
to mitigate tensions and avoid military confrontation are 
likely to predominate over a strategic dialogue to cement 
the foundations of stable security order in the wider Europe.
The final question posed in the introduction to this paper 
was: can the EU and NATO work together to provide 
incentives for Russia to accept a common approach that 
would institutionalise partnership and the cooperative 
management of security  without making concessions 
to perceived Russian agression? In simple terms, how 
does Europe in the longer term move from deterrence to 
engagement with Russia? 
The key to rebuilding relations, may be – as Winston 
Churchill famously suggested – to consider Russia’s 
interests. The demands of modernisation and need for 
stability and prosperity on its Western flank give Russia 
an incentive to retreat from self-exclusion. Russian elites 
have two decades or more of experience of working with 
European institutions; dialogue continues between Lavrov 
and Mogherini and at lower political levels.62 In several of 
the bigger EU member states, notably Germany but also 
Italy and France, there are political and economic elites 
more favourably disposed towards Russia. With more 
astute decision-making in Brussels that takes account 
of the changing priorities of Russia’s policy, Moscow can 
be encouraged to use existing platforms for dialogue on 
broader governance. A joint approach to make the Minsk-2 
Agreements work and stabilise Ukraine would help to ease 
sanctions and revive trade and political-military links, and 
indeed could have a beneficial effect on other disputes in the 
common neighbourhood. 
As far as NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation is concerned, 
since 2014 NATO’s North Atlantic Council and the EU 
Political and Security Committee have met to conduct 
informal discussions on Ukraine and the eastern and 
southern neighbourhoods. There are still reservations in 
member states over deeper cooperation; an institutional and 
political fusion of Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) and NATO63, or reestablishing the European 
Security and Defence Identity to pursue a ‘European pillar 
62 Vladimir Chizhov, interview with Interfaks, 10 December 2015, at http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/
asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1978334 
63 Jolyon Howorth, ‘European Security post-Libya and post-Ukraine: In Search of Core Leadership’, p. 157.
64 See Simon J. Smith, ‘Are the EU and NATO Really Committed to the International Order?’, European 
Leadership Network, 24 September 2015.
65 Sven Biscop, ‘Global and Operational: A New Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy’, p. 1.
within NATO’64, are probably steps too far at the present 
time. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO need to show that 
they are prepared jointly to shape the regional and global 
institutional order rather than just containing collective 
security threats. How far this will be possible while 
recreating a constructive relationship with Moscow depends 
on whether all sides can muster the political will and invest 
in serious and sustained diplomatic engagement.
The EU itself needs to carry out an in-depth assessment of 
its interests in the neighbourhood states and its capacity to 
influence domestic politics there, within a broader overall 
strategy to shape the regional order. In particular, political 
support from the member states is needed for the new security 
strategy, with political and economic instruments – trade, 
migration policy, development, humanitarian cooperation, 
security sector reform – used coherently and institutions 
and financial instruments designed to back up clearly 
enunciated aims. The narrative of Europeanisation should 
not be abandoned but, as one experienced commentator 
suggests, the new strategy should define strategic priorities, 
set a limited number of realistic objectives and communicate 
how the EU perceives its role in the world and how it will 
go about pursuing it.65 Ad hoc groups of member states, 
such as the Normandy format, may be used but should act 
within clear guidelines prioritised at the European level. A 
more coherent policy could also lend support to the OSCE’s 
crisis management/conflict resolution efforts in the frozen 
conflicts, particularly in the humanitarian field. 
The EU and Russia must ultimately address the cause 
of their current estrangement through negotiation over 
the application of core principles, rather than simply 
dealing with the symptoms. This requires a shared vision 
to underpin the restoration of trust: undoubtedly a long-
term affair, with the current regime in Moscow suspicious 
of European norm promotion and unprepared to reform 
its domestic political and economic order. But a sustained 
focus on positive-sum outcomes does have an intellectual 
history – the Helsinki process and post-Cold War efforts 
to involve Russia in European security governance – and 
support from some elites in Moscow. Identifying and acting 
upon shared interests with Russia is a precondition for 
norms and principles to be collectively relegitimised and 
universally applied. Will Europe rise to the challenge?
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